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TEMPORAL CORRELATION OF DEFAULTS IN SUBPRIME
SECURITIZATION
ERIC HILLEBRAND, AMBAR N. SENGUPTA, AND JUNYUE XU
ABSTRACT. We examine the subprime market beginning with a subprime mortgage, fol-
lowed by a portfolio of such mortgages and then a series of such portfolios. We obtain
an explicit formula for the relationship between loss distribution and seniority-based in-
terest rates. We establish a link between the dynamics of house price changes and the
dynamics of default rates in the Gaussian copula framework by specifying a time series
model for a common risk factor. We show analytically and in simulations that serial cor-
relation propagates from the common risk factor to default rates. We simulate prices of
mortgage-backed securities using a waterfall structure and find that subsequent vintages
of these securities inherit temporal correlation from the common risk factor.
1. Introduction
In this paper we (i) derive closed-form mathematical formulas (4.3) and (4.12) con-
necting interest rates paid by tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and the
corresponding loss distributions, (ii) present a two-step Gaussian copula model (Proposi-
tion 6.1) governing correlated CDOs, and (iii) study the behavior of correlated CDOs both
mathematically and through simulations. The context and motivation for this study is the
investigation of mortgage backed securitized structures built out of subprime mortgages
that were at the center of the crisis that began in 2007. Our investigation demonstrates,
both theoretically and numerically, how the serial correlation in the evolution of the com-
mon factor, reflecting the general level of home prices, propagates into a correlated ac-
cumulation of losses in tranches of securitized structures based on subprime mortgages
of specific vintages. The key feature of these mortgages is the short time horizon to de-
fault/prepayment that makes it possible to model the corresponding residential mortgage
backed securities (RMBS) as forming one-period CDOs. We explain the difference in be-
havior between RMBS based on subprime mortgages and those based on prime mortgages
in Table 1 and related discussions.
During the subprime crisis, beginning in 2007, subprime mortgages created at differ-
ent times have defaulted one after another. Figure 1, lower panel, shows the time series
of serious delinquency rates of subprime mortgages from 2002 to 2009. (By definition
of the Mortgage Banker Association, seriously delinquent mortgages refer to mortgages
that have either been delinquent for more than 90 days or are in the process of foreclo-
sure.) Defaults of subprime mortgages are closely connected to house price fluctuations,
as suggested, among others, by [26] (see also [4, 16, 29].) Most subprime mortgages
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FIGURE 1. Two-Year Changes in U.S. House Price and Subprime
ARM Serious Delinquency Rates





US Home Price Index Changes (Two−Year Rolling Window)






US Subprime Adjustable−Rate−Mortgage Serious Delinquency Rates (%)
“U.S. home price two-year rolling changes” are two-year overlapping changes in the S&P Case-Shiller U.S.
National Home Price index. “Subprime ARM Serious Delinquency Rates” are obtained from the Mortgage
Banker Association. Both series cover the first quarter in 2002 to the second quarter in 2009.
are Adjustable-Rate Mortgages (ARM). This means that the interest rate on a subprime
mortgage is fixed at a relatively low level for a “teaser” period, usually two to three years,
after which it increases substantially. Gorton [26] points out that the interest rate usually
resets to such a high level that it “essentially forces” a mortgage borrower to refinance or
default after the teaser period. Therefore, whether the mortgage defaults or not is largely
determined by the borrower’s access to refinancing. At the end of the teaser period, if
the value of the house is much greater than the outstanding principal of the loan, the bor-
rower is likely to be approved for a new loan since the house serves as collateral. On the
other hand, if the value of the house is less than the outstanding principal of the loan, the
borrower is unlikely to be able to refinance and has to default.
We analyze how the dynamics of housing prices propagate, through the dynamics of
defaults, to the dynamics of tranche losses in securitized structures based on subprime
mortgages. To this end, we introduce the notion of vintage correlation, which captures
the correlation of default rates in mortgage pools issued at different times. Under cer-
tain assumptions, vintage correlation is the same as serial correlation. After showing that
changes in a housing index can be regarded as a common risk factor of individual sub-
prime mortgages, we specify a time series model for the common risk factor in the Gauss-
ian copula framework. We show analytically and in simulations that the serial correlation
of the common risk factor introduces vintage correlation into default rates of pools of
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subprime mortgages of subsequent vintages. In this sense, serial correlation propagates
from the common risk factor to default rates. In simulations of the price behavior of
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) over different cohorts, we find that the price of MBS
also exhibits vintage correlation, which is inherited from the common risk factor.
One of our objectives in this paper is to provide a formal examination of one of the im-
portant causes of the current crisis. (For different perspectives on the causes and effects
of the subprime crisis, see also [12, 15, 20, 27, 39, 42, 43].) Vintage correlation in default
rates and MBS prices also has implications for asset pricing. To price some derivatives,
for example forward starting CDO, it is necessary to predict default rates of credit assets
created at some future time. Knowing the serial correlation of default probabilities can
improve the quality of prediction. For risk management in general, some credit asset port-
folios may consist of credit derivatives of different cohorts. Vintage correlation of credit
asset performance affects these portfolios’ risks. For instance, suppose there is a portfolio
consisting of two subsequent vintages of the same MBS. If the vintage correlation of the
MBS price is close to one, for example, the payoff of the portfolio has a variance almost
twice as big as if there were no vintage correlation.
2. The Subprime Structure
In a typical subprime mortgage, the loan is amortized over a long period, usually 30
years, but at the end of the first two (or three) years the interest rate is reset to a signifi-
cantly higher level; a substantial prepayment fee is charged at this time if the loan is paid
off. The aim is to force the borrower to repay the loan (and obtain a new one), and the
prepayment fee essentially represents extraction of equity from the property, assuming
the property has increased in value. If there is sufficient appreciation in the price of the
property then both lender and borrower win. However, if the property value decreases
then the borrower is likely to default.
Let us make a simple and idealized model of the subprime mortgage cashflow. Let
P0 = 1 be the price of the property at time 0, when a loan of the same amount is taken
to purchase the property (or against the property as collateral). At time T the price of
the property is PT , and the loan is terminated, resulting either in a prepayment fee k
plus outstanding loan amount or default, in which case the lender recovers an amount R.
For simplicity of analysis at this stage we assume 0 interest rate up to time T ; we can
view the interest payments as being built into k or R, ignoring, as a first approximation,
defaults prior to time T (for more on early defaults see [7]). The borrower refinances if
PT is above a threshold P∗ (say, the present value of future payments on a new loan) and
defaults otherwise. Thus the net cashflow to the lender is
k1[PT>P∗] − (1−R)1[PT≤P∗], (2.1)
with all payments and values normalized to time-0 money. The expected earning is there-
fore
(k + 1−R)P(PT > P∗)− (1−R),
for the probability measure P being used. We will not need this expected value but ob-
serve simply that a default occurs when PT < P∗, and so, if logPT is Gaussian then
default occurs for a particular mortgage if a suitable standard Gaussian variable takes a
value below some threshold.
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It is clear that nothing like the above model would apply to prime mortgages. The
main risk (for the lender) associated to a long-term prime mortgage is that of prepayment,
though, of course, default risk is also present. A random prepayment time embedded
into the amortization schedule makes it a different problem to value a prime mortgage.
In contrast, for the subprime mortgage the lender is relying on the prepayment fee and
even the borrower hopes to extract equity on the property through refinancing under the
assumption that the property value goes up in the time span [0, T ]. (The prepayment
fee feature has been controversial; see, for example, [14, page 50-51].) We refer to the
studies [7, 14, 26] for details on the economic background, evolution and ramifications of
the subprime mortgage market, which went through a major expansion in the mid 1990s.
3. Portfolio Default Model
Securitization makes it possible to have a much larger pool of potential investors in
a given market. For mortgages the securitization structure has two sides: (i) assets are
mortgages; (ii) liabilities are debts tranched into seniority levels. In this section we briefly
examine the default behavior in a portfolio of subprime mortgages (or any assets that have
default risk at the end of a given time period). In Section 4 we will examine a model
structure for distributing the losses resulting from defaults across tranches.
For our purposes consider N subprime mortgages, issued at time 0 and (p)repaid or
defaulting at time T , each of amount 1. In this section, for the sake of a qualitative
understanding we assume 0 recovery, and that a default translates into a loss of 1 unit (we
neglect interest rates, which can be built in for a more quantitatively accurate analysis).
Current models of home price indices go back to the work of Wyngarden [49] , where
indices were constructed by using prices from repeated sales of the same property at
different times (from which property price changes were calculated). Bailey et al. [3]
examined repeated sales data and developed a regression-based method for constructing
an index of home prices. This was further refined by Case and Shiller [13] into a form that,
in extensions and reformulations, has become an industry-wide standard. The method in
[13] is based on the following model for the price PiT of house i at time T :
logPiT = CT +HiT +NiT , (3.1)
where CT is the log-price at time T across a region (city, in their formulation), HiT is
a mean-zero Gaussian random walk (with variance same for all i), and NiT is a house-
specific random error of zero mean and constant variance (not dependent on i). The three
terms on the right in equation (3.1) are independent and (NiT ) is a sale-specific fluctuation
that is serially uncorrelated; a variety of correlation structures could be introduced in
modifications of the model. We will return to this later in equation (5.7) (with slightly
different notation) where we will consider different values of T . For now we focus on a
portfolio of N subprime mortgages i ∈ {1, . . . , N} with a fixed value of T .





where mi is the mean and si is the standard devation of logPiT with respect to some
probability measure of interest (for example, the market pricing risk-neutral measure).
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1− ρ εi (3.3)
for some ρ > 0, where (Z, ε1, . . . , εN ) is a standard Gaussian inRN+1, with independent
components. Mortgage i defaults when Xi crosses below a threshold X∗, so that the
assumed common default probability for the mortgages is















Pooling of investment funds and lending them for property mortgages is natural and
has long been in practice (see Bogue [9, page 73]). In the modern era Ginnie Mae issued
the first MBS in 1970 in “pass through” form which did not protect against prepayment
risk. In 1983 Freddie Mac issued Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) that had
a waterfall-like structure and seniority classes with different maturities. The literature on
securitization is vast (see, for instance, [19, 36, 41]).
4. Tranche Securitization: Loss Distribution and Tranche Rates
In this section we derive a relation between the loss distribution in a cashflow CDO and
the interest rates paid by the tranches. We make the simplifying assumption that all losses
and payments occur at the end of one period. This assumption is not unreasonable for
subprime mortgages that have a short interest-rate reset period, which we take effectively
as the lifetime of the mortgage (at the end of which it either pays back in full with interest
or defaults). We refer to the constituents of the portfolio as “loans”, though they could
be other instruments. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the portfolio and cashflows. As
pointed out by [10, page xvii] there is “very little research or literature” available on cash
CDOs; the complex waterfall structures that govern cashflows of such CDOs are difficult
to model in a mathematically sound way. For technical descriptions of cashflow waterfall
structures, see [23, Chapter 14].
Consider a portfolio ofN loans, each with face value of one unit. Let S(T ) be the cash
inflow from the investments made by the portfolio at time T , the end of the investment
period. Next consider investors named 1, 2, . . . ,M , with investor j investing amount Ij .
The most senior investor, labeled 1, receives an interest rate r1 (return per unit investment
over the full investment period) if at all possible; this investor’s cash inflow at time T is
Y1(T ) = min {S(T ), (1 + r1)I1} . (4.1)
Proceeding in this way, investor j has payoff
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FIGURE 2. Illustration of schematic structure of MBS
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Yj(T ) = min
S(T )− ∑
1≤i<j
Yi(T ), (1 + rj)Ij
 . (4.2)
Using the market pricing measure (risk-neutral measure) Q we should have
EQ[Yj(T )] = (1 +R0)Ij , (4.3)
where R0 is the risk-free interest rate for the period of investment.
Given a model for S(T ), the rates rj can be worked out, in principle, recursively from
equation (4.2) as follows. Using the distribution of X(1) we can back out the value of the
supersenior rate r1 from
EQ [min {S(T ), (1 + r1)I1}] = EQ[Y1(T )] = (1 +R0)I1. (4.4)
Now we use this value of r1 in the equation for Y2(T ):
EQ [min {S(T )− Y1(T ), (1 + r2)I2}] = EQ[Y2(T )] = (1 +R0)I2, (4.5)
and (numerically) invert this to obtain the value of r2 implied by the market model. Note
that in equation (4.5) the random variable Y1(T ) on the left is given by equation (4.1)
using the already computed value of r1. Proceeding in this way yields the full spectrum
of tranche rates rj .
Now we turn to a continuum model for tranches, again with one time period. Consider
an idealized securitization structure ABS. Investors are subordinatized by a seniority pa-
rameter y ∈ [0, 1]. An investor in a thin “tranchelet” [y, y+δy] invests the amount δy and
is promised an interest rate of r(y) (return on unit investment for the entire investment
period) if there is no default. In this section we consider only one time period, at the end
of which the investment vehicle closes.
TEMPORAL CORRELATION OF DEFAULTS 493
Thus, if there is sufficient return on the investment made by the ABS, a tranche [a, b] ⊂






In particular, assuming that the total initial investment in the portfolio is normalized to














dy − S(T ), (4.6)
where S(T ) is the total cash inflow, all assumed to occur at time T , from investments
made by the ABS. Note that L is a random variable, since S(T ) is random.
Consider a thin tranche [y, y + δy]. If S(T ) is greater than the maximum amount













S(T ) is insufficient to cover the more senior investors, the tranchelet [y, y + δy] receives
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δy = (1 +R0) δy, (4.9)











= 1 +R0 (4.10)
where FL is the distribution function of the loss L with respect to the measure Q.








which is strictly increasing as a function of y, with slope > 1 (assuming the rates r(·) are







If r(y) are the market rates then the market-implied loss distribution function FL is given
by (4.12). On the other hand, if we have a prior model for the loss distribution FL then
the implied rates r(y) can be computed numerically using (4.12).
494 E. HILLEBRAND, A. N. SENGUPTA, AND J. XU
A real tranche is a “thick” segment [a, b] ⊂ [0, 1] and offers investors some rate r[a,b].
This rate could be viewed as obtained from the balance equation:













5. Modeling Temporal Correlation in Subprime Securitization
We turn now to the study of a portfolio consisting of several CDOs (each homoge-
neous) belonging to different vintages. We model the loss by a “multi-stage” copula,
one operating within each CDO and the other across the different CDOs. The motiva-
tion comes from the subprime context. Each CDO is comprised of subprime mortgages
of a certain vintage, all with a common default/no-default decision horizon (typically two
years). It is important to note that we do not compare losses at different times for the same
CDO; we thus avoid problems in using a copula model across different time horizons.
Definition 5.1 (Vintage Correlation). Suppose we have a pool of mortgages created
at each time v = 1, 2, · · · , V . Denote the default rates of each vintage observed at
a fixed time T > V as p1, p2, · · · , pV , respectively. We define vintage correlation
φj := Corr(p1, pj) for j = 2, 3, · · · , V as the default correlation between the j − th
vintage and the first vintage.
As an example of vintage correlation, consider wines of different vintages. Suppose
there are several wine producers that have produced wines of ten vintages from 2011
to 2020. The wines are packaged according to vintages and producers, that is, one box
contains one vintage by one producer. In the year 2022, all boxes are opened and the per-
centage of wines that have gone bad is obtained for each box. Consider the correlation of
fractions of bad wines between the first vintage and subsequent vintages. This correlation
is what we call vintage correlation.
The definition of vintage correlation can be extended easily to the case where the base
vintage is not the first vintage but any one of the other vintages. Obviously, vintage cor-
relation is very similar to serial correlation. There are two main differences. First, the
consideration is at a specific time in the future. Second, in calculating the correlation
between any two vintages, the expected values are averages over the cross-section. That
is, in the wine example, expected values are averages over producers. In mortgage pools,
they are averages over different mortgage pools. Only if we assume the same stochastic
structure for the cross-section and for the time series of default rates, vintage correlation
and serial correlation are equivalent. We do not have to make this assumption to obtain
our main results. Making this assumption, however, does not invalidate any of the re-
sults either. Therefore, we use the terms “vintage correlation” and “serial correlation”
interchangeably in our paper.
To model vintage correlation in subprime securitization, we use the Gaussian copula
approach of Li [34], widely used in industry to model default correlation across names.
The literature on credit risk pricing with copulas and other models has grown substantially
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in recent years and an exhaustive review is beyond the scope of his paper; monographs in-
clude [8, 18, 32, 40, 44]. Other works include, for example, [1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 17, 22, 24, 30,
33, 35, 45, 46]. There are approaches to model default correlation other than default-time
copulas. One method relies on the so-called structural model, which goes back to Mer-
ton’s (1974) work on pricing corporate debt. An essential point of the structural model
is that it links the default event to some observable economic variables. The paper [31]
extends the model to a multi-issuer scenario, which can be applied to price corporate debt
CDO. It is assumed that a firm defaults if its credit index hits a certain barrier. Therefore,
correlation between credit indices determines the correlation of default events. The ad-
vantage of a structural model is that it gives economic meaning to underlying variables.
Other approaches to CDO pricing are found, for example, in [28] and in [47]. The work
[11] provides a comparison of common CDO pricing models.
In our model each mortgage i of vintage v has a default time τv,i, which is a random
variable representing the time at which the mortgage defaults. If the mortgage never
defaults, this value is infinity. If we assume that the distribution of τv,i is the same across
all mortgages of vintage v, we have
Fv(s) = P[τv,i < s], ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N, (5.1)
where the index i denotes individual mortgages and the index v denotes vintages. We
assume that Fv is continuous and strictly increasing. Given this information, for each
vintage v the Gaussian copula approach provides a way to obtain the joint distribution of
the τv,i across i. Generally, a copula is a joint distribution function
C (u1, u2, ..., uN ) = P (U1 ≤ u1, U2 ≤ u2, ..., UN ≤ uN ) ,
where u1, u2, ..., uN areN uniformly distributed random variables that may be correlated.
It can be easily verified that the function
C [F1(x1), F2(x2), ..., FN (xN )] = G(x1, x2, ..., xN ) (5.2)
is a multivariate distribution function with marginals given by the distribution functions
F1(x1), F2(x2),..., FN (xN ). Sklar [48] proved the converse, showing that for an arbi-
trary multivariate distribution functionG(x1, x2, ..., xN ) with continuous marginal distri-
butions functions F1(x1), F2(x2),..., FN (xN ), there exists a unique C such that equation
(5.2) holds. Therefore, in the case of default times, there is a Cv for each vintage v such
that
Cv [Fv(t1), Fv(t2), ..., Fv(tN )] = Gv(t1, t2, ..., tN ), (5.3)
where Gv on the right is the joint distribution function of (τv,1, . . . , τv,N ). Since we
assume Fv to be continuous and strictly increasing, we can find a standard Gaussian
random variable Xv,i such that




v (Φ(Xv,i)) ∀v = 1, 2, ..., V ; i = 1, 2, ..., N, (5.5)
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where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. To see that this is correct, observe
that
P[τv,i ≤ s] = P [Φ(Xv,i) ≤ Fv(s)] = P
[







The Gaussian copula approach assumes that the joint distribution of (Xv,1, . . . , Xv,N ) is
a multivariate normal distribution function ΦN . Thus the joint distribution function of
default times τv,i is obtained once the correlation matrix of theXv,i is known. A standard
simplification in practice is to assume that the pairwise correlations between differentXv,i
are the same across i. Suppose that the value of this correlation is ρv for each vintage v.





1− ρvεi ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; v = 1, 2, . . . , V, (5.6)
where εv,i are i.i.d. standard Gaussian random variables and Zv is a Gaussian random
variable independent of the εv,i. It can be shown easily that in each vintage v, the variables
Xv,i defined in this way have the exact joint distribution function ΦN .
Using the information above, for each vintage v, the Gaussian copula approach obtains
the joint distribution function Gv for default times as follows. First, N Gaussian random
variablesXv,i are generated according to equation (5.6). Second, from equation (5.5) a set
of N default times τv,i is obtained, which has the desired joint distribution function Gv .
In equation (5.6), the common factor Zv can be viewed as a latent variable that captures
the default risk in the economy, and εi is the idiosyncratic risk for each mortgage. The
variable Xv,i can be viewed as a state variable for each mortgage. The parameter ρv is
the correlation between any two individual state variables. It is obvious that the higher the
value of ρv , the greater the correlation between the default times of different mortgages.
Assume that we have a pool of N mortgages i = 1, . . . , N for each vintage v =
1, . . . , V . Each individual mortgage within a pool has the same initiation date v and
interest adjustment date v′ > v. Let Yv,i be the change in the logarithm of the price Pv,i
of borrower i’s (of vintage v) house during the teaser period [v, v′]. From equation (3.1),
we can deduce that
Yv,i := logPv′,i − logPv,i = ∆Cv + ev,i, (5.7)
where ∆Cv := logCv′ − logCv is the change in the logarithm of a housing market index
Cv , and ev,i are i.i.d. normal random variables for all i = 1, 2, ..., N , and v = 1, 2, ..., V .
As outlined in the introduction, default rates of subprime ARM depend on house price
changes during the teaser period. If the house price fails to increase substantially or even
declines, the mortgage borrower cannot refinance, absent other substantial improvements
in income or asset position. They have to default shortly after the interest rate is reset to
a high level. We assume that the default, if it happens, occurs at time v′. Therefore, we
assume that a mortgage defaults if and only if Yv,i < Y ∗, where Y ∗ is a predetermined
threshold.
We can now give a structural interpretation of the common risk factor Zv in the Gauss-
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where σe is the standard deviation of ev,i, and ε′v,i := ev,i/σe. The third equality follows


















1− ρ′ε′v,i ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2, . . . , T (5.9)
Note that equation (5.9) has exactly the same form as equation (5.6). The default event is





















then the default event can be defined equivalently as τ ′v,i ≤ τ∗′. The comparison between
equation (5.9) and (5.6) shows that the common risk factor Zv in the Gaussian copula
model for subprime mortgages can be interpreted as a standardized change in a house
price index. This is consistent with our remarks in the context of (3.2) that the Case-
Shiller model provides a direct justification for using the Gaussian copula, with common
risk factor being the housing price index.
In light of this structural interpretation, the common risk factor Zv is very likely to
be serially correlated across subsequent vintages. More specifically, we find that Z ′v is
proportional to a moving average of monthly log changes in a housing price index. To see




d log Iτ ,
where I is the house price index. For example, if we measure house price index changes




(log Iτ − log Iτ−1), (5.10)
where the unit of τ is a quarter. If we model this index by some random shock arriving
each quarter, equation (5.10) is a moving average process. Therefore, from equation (5.8)
we know that Z ′v has positive serial correlation. Figure 1 shows that the time series of
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Case-Shiller index changes exhibits strong autocorrelation, and is possibly integrated of
order one.
6. The Main Theorems: Vintage Correlation in Default Rates
Since the common risk factor is likely to be serially correlated, we examine the impli-
cations for the stochastic properties of mortgage default rates. We specify a time series
model for the common risk factor in the Gaussian copula and determine the relationship
between the serial correlation of the default rates and that of the common risk factor.









1− ρ′ ε′k (6.1)
with
Z ′ = φZ +
√
1− φ2 u, (6.2)
where ρ, ρ′ ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ (−1, 1), and Z, ε1, ..., εN , ε′1, ..., ε′N , u are mutually indepen-
dent standard Gaussians. Consider next the number of Xk that fall below some threshold











where X∗ and X ′∗ are constants. Then
Cov(A,A′) = N2Cov(p, p′), (6.4)
where









p′ = P[X ′k ≤ X ′∗ |Z ′] = p′(Z ′).
(6.5)
Moreover, the correlation between A and A′ equals the correlation between p and p′, in
the limit as N →∞.
Proof. We first show that
E[AA′] = E [E[A |Z]E[A′ |Z ′]] . (6.6)
Note that A is a function of Z and ε = (ε1, . . . , εN ), and A′ is a function (indeed, the
same function as it happens) of Z ′ and ε′ = (ε′1, . . . , ε
′
N ). Now for any non-negative
bounded Borel functions f and g on R, and any non-negative bounded Borel functions F
and G on R×RN , we have, on using self-evident notation,





1− φ2x︸ ︷︷ ︸
z′
)F (z, y1, ..., yN︸ ︷︷ ︸
y














= E [f(Z)g(Z ′)E[F (Z, ε) |Z]E[G(Z ′, ε′) |Z ′]] .
(6.7)
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This says that
E [F (Z, ε)G(Z ′, ε′) |Z,Z ′] = E[F (Z, ε) |Z]E[G(Z ′, ε′) |Z ′]. (6.8)
Taking expectation on both sides of equation (6.8) with respect to Z and Z ′, we obtain
E [F (Z, ε)G(Z ′, ε′)] = E [E[F (Z, ε) |Z]E[G(Z ′, ε′) |Z ′]] . (6.9)
Substituting F (Z, ε) = A, and G(Z ′, ε′) = A′, we have equation (6.6) and
E[AA′] = E [E[A |Z]E[A′ |Z ′]]
= E[NpNp′] = N2E[pp′],
(6.10)
The last line is due to the fact that conditional onZ,A is a sum ofN independent indicator
variables and follows a binomial distribution with parameters N and Ep. Applying (6.9)
again with F (Z, ε) = A, and G(Z ′, ε′) = 1, or indeed, much more directly by repeated
expectations, we have
E[A] = NE[p], and E[A′] = NE[p′]. (6.11)
Hence we conclude that
Cov(A,A′) = E(AA′)− E[A]E[A′]
= N2E[pp′]−N2E[p]E[p′]






−N2(E[p])2 = NE[p(1− p)] +N2 Var(p). (6.12)
Similarly,
Var(A′) = NE[p′(1− p′)] +N2 Var(p′).









= Corr(p, p′) as N →∞.
(6.13)

Theorem 6.2 (Vintage Correlation in Default Rates). Consider a pool of N mortgages
created at each time v, where N is fixed. Suppose within each vintage v, defaults are
governed by a Gaussian copula model as in equations (5.1), (5.5), and (5.6) with com-
mon risk factor Zv being a zero-mean stationary Gaussian process. Assume further that
ρv = Corr(Xv,i, Xv,j), the correlation parameter for state variables Xv,i of individ-
ual mortgages of vintage v, is positive. Then, Av and Av′ , the numbers of defaults
observed at time T within mortgage vintages v and v′ are correlated if and only if
φv,v′ = Corr(Zv, Zv′) 6= 0, where Zv is the common Gaussian risk factor process.
Moreover, in the large portfolio limit, Corr(Av, Av′) approaches a limiting value deter-
mined by φv,v′ , ρv , and ρv′ .
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Proof. Conditional on the common risk factor Zv , the number of defaults Av is a sum of
N independent indicator variables and follows a binomial distribution. More specifically,






where pv is the default probability conditional on Zv , i.e.,




where Fv(T ) is the probability of default before the time T . Then



















Note that if Zv and Zv′ are jointly Gaussian with correlation coefficient φv,v′ , we can
write
Zv = φv,v′Zv′ +
√
1− φ2v,v′ uv,v′ for t > j, (6.19)
where uv,v′ are standard Gaussians that are independent of Zv′ . Combining equation




































Since a > 0 as ρv ∈ (0, 1), we know that the covariance and the correlation between pv
and pv′ are determined by φv,v′ , ρv , and ρv′ . They are nonzero if and only if φv,v′ 6= 0.






1 + E[pv′ (1−pv′ )]
N Var(pv)
∀v 6= v′. (6.22)
Therefore, Av and Av′ have nonzero correlation as long as pv and pv′ do. 
TEMPORAL CORRELATION OF DEFAULTS 501
Equations (6.21) and (6.22) provide closed-form expressions for the serial correlation
of default rates pv of different vintages and the number of defaults Av . However, we
cannot directly read from equation (6.21) how the vintage correlation of default rates
depends on φv,v′ . The theorem below (whose proof extends an idea from [37]) shows that
this dependence is always positive.
Theorem 6.3 (Dependence on Common Risk Factor). Under the same settings as in
Theorem 6.2, assume that both the serial correlation φv,v′ of the common risk factor and
the individual state variable correlation ρv are always positive. Then the number Av of
defaults in the vintage-v cohort by time T is positively correlated with the number Av′ in
the vintage-(v′) cohort. Moreover, this correlation is an increasing function of the serial
correlation parameter φv,v′ in the common risk factor.
Proof. We will use the notation established in Proposition 6.1. We can assume that
v 6= v′. Recall that in the Gaussian copula model, name i in the vintage-v cohort de-
faults by time T if the standard Gaussian variable Xv,i falls below a threshold X∗v . The
unconditional default probability is
P[Xv,i ≤ X∗v ] = Φ(X∗v ).






= N2Cov(1[X≤X∗v ],1[X′≤X∗v′ ]
),
(6.23)
whereX,X ′ are jointly Gaussian, each standard Gaussian, with mean zero and covariance
E[XX ′] = E[Xv,kXv′,l],
which is the same for all pairs k, l, since v 6= v′. This common value of the covariance
arises from the covariance between Zv and Zv′ along with the covariance between any
Xv,k with Zv; it is
Cov(X,X ′) = φj
√
ρvρv′ . (6.24)






[X ′ − φv,v′
√
ρvρv′X]. (6.25)
We can check readily that these are standard Gaussians with zero covariance, and
X = W1,










The assumption that ρ and φv,v′ are positive (and, of course, less than 1) implies that
0 < α < 1.
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Note that the covariance between pv and pv′ can be expressed as












= P [Xv,i ≤ X∗v , Xv′,i ≤ X∗v ]− E(pv)E(pv′)
= P
[
W1 ≤ X∗v , αW1 +
√











ϕ(w1) dw1 − E(pv)E(pv′),
where ϕ(·) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. The
third equality follows from equation (6.9). The fifth equality follows from equation (6.26).
The unconditional expectation of pv is independent of α, because




































































Substituting equation (6.29) into (6.28), we have
∂
∂α














(w1 − αX∗v′) exp
[
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TABLE 1. Default Probabilities Through Time (F (τ)).
Subprime
Time (Month) 12 24 36 72 144
Default Probability 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14
Prime
Time (Month) 12 24 36 72 144
Default Probability 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
with ρs and φv,v′ assumed to be positive, we know that the partial derivatives of the co-
variance with respect to φv,v′ , ρv and ρv′ are also positive everywhere. Note that the
unconditional variance of pv is independent of φv,v′ (although dependent of ρs), which
can be seen from equation (6.15). It follows that the serial correlation of pv has positive
partial derivative with respect to φv,v′ . Recall equation (6.21), which shows that the co-
variance of pv and pv′ is zero for any value of ρs when φv,v′ = 0. This result together
with the positive partial derivatives of the covariance with respect to φv,v′ ensure that
the covariance and thus the vintage correlation of pv and pv′ is always positive. From
equation (6.22), noticing the fact that both the expectation and variance of pv are inde-
pendent of φv,v′ , we know that the correlation between Av and Av′ must also be positive
everywhere and monotonically increasing in φv,v′ . 
7. Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, we study the link between serial correlation in a common risk factor
and vintage correlation in pools of mortgages in two sets of simulations: First, a series
of mortgage pools is simulated to illustrate the analytical results of Section 6. Second, a
waterfall structure is simulated to study temporal correlation in MBS.
7.1. Vintage Correlation in Mortgage Pools. We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to
study how serial correlation of a common risk factor propagates into vintage correlation in
default rates. We simulate default times for individual mortgages according to equations
(5.1), (5.5), and (5.6). From the simulated default times, the default rate of a pool of mort-
gages is calculated. In each simulation, we construct a cohort of N = 100 homogeneous
mortgages in every month v = 1, 2, . . . , 120. We simulate a monthly time series of the
common risk factor Zv , which is assumed to have an AR(1) structure with unconditional
mean zero and variance one,
Zv = φZv−1 +
√
1− φ2 uv ∀v = 2, 3, . . . , 120. (7.1)
The errors uv are i.i.d. standard Gaussian. The initial observation Z1 is a standard normal
random variable. We report the case where φ = 0.95. Each mortgage i issued at time v
has a state variable Xv,i assigned to it that determines its default time. The time series
properties of Xv,i follow equation (5.6). The error εi in equation (5.6) is independent of
uv .
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FIGURE 3. Serial Correlation in Default Rates of Subprime Mortgages




Default Rates Across Vintages













Sample Partial Autocorrelation Function
To simulate the actual default rates of mortgages, we need to specify the marginal dis-
tribution functions of default times F (·) as in equation (5.1). We define a function F(·),
which takes a time period as argument and returns the default probability of a mortgage
within that time period since its initiation. We assume that this F(·) is fixed across differ-
ent vintages, which means that mortgages of different cohorts have a same unconditional
default probability in the next S periods from their initiation, where S = 1, 2, . . . . It is
easy to verify that Fv(T ) = F(T − v). The values of the function F(·) are specified in
Table 1, for both subprime and prime mortgages. Intermediate values of F(·) are linearly
interpolated from this table. While these values are in the same range as actual default
rates of subprime and prime mortgages in the last ten years, their specification is rather
arbitrary as it has little impact on the stochastic structure of the simulated default rates.
We set the observation time T to be 144, which is two years after the creation of the last
vintage, as we need to give the last vintage some time window to have possible default
events. For example, in each month from 1998 to 2007, 100 mortgages are created.
We need to consider two cases, subprime and prime. For the subprime case, every
vintage is given a two-year window to default, so the unconditional default probability
is constant across vintages. On the other hand, prime mortgages have decreasing default
probability through subsequent vintages. For example, in our simulation, the first vintage
has a time window of 144 months to default, the second vintage has 143 months, the
third has 142 months, and so on. Therefore, older vintages are more likely to default by
observation time T than newer vintages. This is why the fixed ex-post observation time
of defaults is one difference that distinguishes vintage correlation from serial correlation.
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FIGURE 4. Serial Correlation in Default Rates of Prime Mortgages




Default Rates Across Vintages













Sample Partial Autocorrelation Function
We construct a time series τv,i of default times of mortgage i issued at time v according
to equation (5.5). (Note that this is not a time series of default times for a single mortgage,
since a single mortgage defaults only once or never. Rather, the index i is a placeholder
for a position in a mortgage pool. In this sense, τv,i is the time series of default times of





#{mortgages for which τv,i ≤ τ∗v }
N
.
In the subprime case, τ∗v = 24; in the prime case, τ
∗
v = T − v varies across vintages.
The simulation is repeated 1000 times. For the subprime case, the average simulated
default rates are plotted in Figure 3. For the prime case, average simulated default rates
are plotted in Figure 4. Note that because of the decreasing time window to default, the
default rates in Figure 4 have a decreasing trend.
In the subprime case, we can use the sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation
functions to estimate vintage correlation, because the unconditional default probability is
constant across vintages, so that averaging over different vintages and averaging over
different pools is the same. In the prime case, we have to calculate vintage correlation
proper. Since we have 1000 Monte Carlo observations of default rates for each vintage,
we can calculate the correlation between two vintages using those samples. For the partial
autocorrelation function, we simply demean the series of default rates and obtain the usual
partial autocorrelation function. We plot the estimated vintage correlation in the second
rows of Figure 3 and 4 for subprime and prime cases, respectively. As can be seen, the
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correlation of the default rates of the first vintage with older vintages decreases geometri-
cally. In both cases, the estimated first-order coefficient of default rates is close to but less
than φ = 0.95, the AR(1) coefficient of the common risk factor. The partial autocorrela-
tion functions are plotted in the third rows of Figures 3 and 4. They are significant only
at lag one. This phenomenon is also observed when we set φ to other values. Both the
sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions indicate that the default rates
follow a first-order autoregressive process, similar to the specification of the common risk
factor. However, compared with the subprime case, the default rates of prime mortgages
seem to have longer memory.
The similarity between the magnitude of the autocorrelation coefficient of default rates
and common risk factor can be explained by the following Taylor expansion. Taylor-








Since pv is approximately linear in Z∗v , which is a linear transformation of Zt, it follows
a stochastic process that has approximately the same serial correlation as Zt.
7.2. Vintage Correlation in Waterfall Structures. We have already shown using the
Gaussian copula approach that the time series of default rates in mortgage pools inherits
vintage correlation from the serial correlation of the common risk factor. We now study
how this affects the performance of assets such as MBS that are securitized from the
mortgage pool in a so-called waterfall. The basic elements of the simulation are: (i) A
time line of 120 months and an observation time T = 144. (ii) The mortgage contract
has a principal of $ 1, maturity of 15 years, and annual interest rate 9%. Fixed monthly
payments are received until the mortgage defaults or is paid in full. A pool of 100 such
mortgages is created every month. (iii) There is a pool of 100 units of MBS, each of
principal $1, securitized from each month’s mortgage cohort. There are four tranches: the
senior tranche, the mezzanine tranche, the subordinate tranche, and the equity tranche.
The senior tranche consists of the top 70% of the face value of all mortgages created
in each month; the mezzanine tranche consists of the next 25%; the subordinate tranche
consist of the next 4%; the equity tranche has the bottom 1%. Each senior MBS pays an
annual interest rate of 6%; each mezzanine MBS pays 15%; each subordinate MBS pays
20%. The equity tranche does not pay interest but retains residual profits, if any.
The basic setup of the simulation is illustrated in Figure 2. For a cohort of mort-
gages issued at time v and the MBS derived from it, the securitization process works
as follows. At the end of each month, each mortgage either defaults or makes a fixed
monthly payment. The method to determine default is the same that we have used before:
mortgage i issued at time v defaults at τv,i, which is generated by the Gaussian copula
approach according to equations (5.1), (5.5), and (5.6). We consider both subprime and
prime scenarios, as in the case of default rates. For subprime mortgages, we assume that
each individual mortgage receives a prepayment of the outstanding principal at the end
of the teaser period if it has not defaulted, so the default events and cash flows only hap-
pen within the teaser period. For the prime case, there is no such restriction. Again, we
assume the common risk factor to follow an AR(1) process with first-order autocorrela-
tion coefficient φ = 0.95. The cross-name correlation coefficient ρ is set to be 0.5. The
unconditional default probabilities over time are obtained from Table 1.
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The first row plots the vintage correlation of the principal loss of each tranche. The correlation is estimated
using the sample autocorrelation function. The second row plots the partial autocorrelation functions.
If a mortgage has not defaulted, the interest payments received from it are used to
pay the interest specified on the MBS from top to bottom. Thus, the cash inflow is used
to pay the senior tranche first (6% of the remaining principal of the senior tranche at
the beginning of the month). The residual amount, if any, is used to pay the mezzanine
tranche, after that the subordinate tranche, and any still remaining funds are collected
in the equity tranche. If the cash inflow passes a tranche threshold but does not cover
the following tranche, it is prorated to the following tranche. Any residual funds after
all the non-equity tranches have been paid add to the principal of the equity tranche.
Principal payments are processed analogously. We assume a recovery rate of 50% on
the outstanding principal for defaulted mortgages. The 50% loss of principal is deducted
from the principal of the lowest ranked outstanding MBS.
Before we examine the vintage correlation of the present value of MBS tranches, we
look at the time series of total principal loss across MBS tranches. In our simulations, no
loss of principal occurred for the senior tranche. The series of expected principal losses
of other tranches and their sample autocorrelation and sample partial autocorrelation are
plotted in Figures 5 and 6 for subprime and prime scenarios respectively. We use the
same method to obtain the autocorrelation functions for prime mortgages as in the case of
default rates. The correlograms show that the expected loss of principal for each tranche
follows an AR(1) process.
The series of present values of cash flows for each tranche and their sample autocor-
relation and partial autocorrelation functions are plotted in Figures 7 and 8 for subprime
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The first row plots the vintage correlation of the principal loss of each tranche. The correlation is estimated
using the correlation between the first and subsequent vintages, each of which has a Monte Carlo sample size
of 1000. The second row plots the partial autocorrelation functions of the demeaned series of principal losses.
and prime scenarios, respectively. The senior tranche displays a significant first-order au-
tocorrelation coefficient due to losses in interest payments although there are no losses
in principal. The partial autocorrelation functions, which have significant positive values
for more than one lag, suggest that the cash flows may not follow an AR(1) process due
to the high non-linearity. However, the estimated vintage correlation still decreases over
vintages, same as in an AR(1) process, which indicates that our findings for default rates
can be extended to cash flows.
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